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Linda McAvan, MEP
MEP for Yorkshire and the Humber, spokesperson 
on the environment and climate change for 
Labour and the Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats (S&D) group in the European 
Parliament; member of the European 
Parliament’s Environment Committee.
The European Union (EU) has played a leading role 
globally in the fight against climate change. It remains 
the only major economic block to pass legally binding 
targets for the reduction of carbon emissions. In 2008 
MEPs and Ministers from the 27 EU member states 
passed a package of measures to tackle climate change 
by aiming for a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions; improving energy efficiency by 20%; and by 
increasing the percentage of EU energy created from 
renewable sources to 20% by 2020 (compared to  
1990 levels). 
To meet these targets the EU has utilised a number 
of policy instruments including the Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS), a system of ‘effort sharing’ 
to set binding emissions reduction targets, and a 
fund of up to €1 billion to promote the development 
of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). However, 
action in tackling climate change has to involve 
the EU institutions working together with national 
governments and regional and local authorities as well 
as stakeholders in business and civil society and, of 
course, individual citizens.
The Yorkshire and the Humber region is undoubtedly 
affected by climate change but it is also in a position 
to reap significant economic benefits from decisive 
climate action.  With its history of fishing, coal mining 
and heavy industry our region has the highest C0
2 
emissions of any other UK region. But EU policies  
are driving investment in modern technology (such  
as the production of off-shore wind turbines).  
Our region is home to four proposed CCS power  
plants and proposals for the world’s largest off-shore 
wind farm off the region’s coast. If realised, these 
developments would put this region at the forefront  
of the new green technology industry.
This report makes a very important and timely 
contribution in highlighting some of the research 
being undertaken on climate change related issues 
in universities in this region and beyond. It rightly 
emphasises not only the challenges but also the 
opportunities provided by climate change, and the 
ways in which different societal actors (including 
businesses and NGOs), cities and governments are 
working together and are forming new alliances to 
respond to climate change.
Foreword
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Jon Price
Director, Centre for Low Carbon Futures
In May 2013, Hawaii’s Mauna Loa observatory 
reported that the concentration of climate-
warming carbon dioxide in the atmosphere had 
passed the milestone level of 400 parts per million 
(ppm). In April 2013, prices in the EU’s emissions 
trading scheme fell to record lows of  below €3 a 
tonne of carbon dioxide. Up until mid-June, five 
months after its launch, not a single household 
in the UK has completed the process of making 
their home more energy efficient under the UK 
government’s flagship Green Deal.
Not many years ago, the UK and the EU were seen 
as climate change pioneers, with ground-breaking 
climate legislation and emission trading schemes 
(the EU ETS) ensuring global leadership. If we are 
to believe the press, our collective actions on climate 
change appear to be in a mess So what’s happened? 
Is it because of a combination of industry lobbying 
and recession swamping the market with permits to 
emit carbon “that prices have slumped and no longer 
impose any constraint on behaviour” (Financial 
Times, 17 April 2013), or is it because of a failure at a 
global scale? The annual United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Conference of Parties (COP) at Doha in November 
2012 had probably the lowest profile of any COP since 
Nairobi in 2006. It re-established some legitimacy by 
ending in a deal comprising 26 decisions under the 
COP and 13 decisions under the ‘Conference of the 
Kyoto Protocol’ Parties – notably adopting a Second 
Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol (KPII) and 
moving the Green Climate Fund and the Technology 
Executive Committee to operational realities. Whilst 
this new agreement accounts for less than 15% of 
global emissions, it preserves a multilateral, rules-based 
structure through a second period of commitment. 
But despite more than 20 years of accumulating 
evidence, our responses to climate change seem to 
be dismally inadequate. It’s clear that carbon markets 
have partially failed to address the issue as they rely 
on political compromise, while the failures of the UK 
Green Deal are justified by policymakers because 
“it’s only just starting”. Should we instead be looking 
to new climate alliances, to local rather than national 
governments in managing growing urbanisation, and 
to greater roles for civil society in legitimising their 
national governments’ climate change policy and 
regulations?
The context of the recent Mauna Loa observatory 
report of 400ppm “is a significant reminder of the 
rapid rate at which - and the extent to which - we have 
increased the concentration of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere....We must hope that the world 
crossing this milestone will bring about awareness of 
the scientific reality of climate change and how human 
society should deal with the challenge.” (Prof Rajendra 
Pachauri, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change).
This report, produced by the University of Hull, is 
therefore very welcome for its valuable insights into 
new climate alliances and links to further research. 
Foreword
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Introduction
Elizabeth Monaghan, Rüdiger Wurzel,  
Andrew E. G. Jonas, David Gibbs,  
James Connelly and Sally Eden,  
University of Hull
In July 2012 researchers from the 
Departments of Politics and Geography 
at the University of Hull hosted an 
international, interdisciplinary workshop 
on European climate change governance. 
Supported by funding from the University 
of Hull and under the university’s 
strategic research theme on Energy and 
Environment, the workshop brought 
together researchers and practitioners 
from across the UK and Europe, to 
discuss and analyse contemporary 
developments and challenges in climate 
change governance. This report presents 
some of the key discussions and findings 
arising from the workshop.
European climate change and energy governance aims 
to bring about a sustainable path towards low carbon 
societies. Governments have traditionally dominated 
international discussions about the nature of the climate 
challenge and the measures necessary to tackle it. 
However, the range of actors who encounter climate 
change adaptation and mitigation in their everyday 
experiences and the levels of scales at which climate 
issues are experienced and tackled, go far beyond 
governments acting at the national level. The starting 
point for the workshop and this report has been to 
examine the role and activities of businesses, civil 
society organisations, and regional and local authorities 
– and the alliances and coalitions within and between 
them – at local, regional, national, European and 
international levels.
The contributions to this report provide a snapshot 
of the research in progress in this area. As pieces 
of academic research they touch upon theoretical 
and conceptual as well as empirical questions, 
though the focus is mainly on the practical impacts 
and consequences of the research findings. Each 
contribution includes suggestions of related academic 
literature for readers who may wish to delve further 
into the issues. The report starts at the conceptual level 
with Liefferink, Veenman and Wiering developing the 
concept of an ‘environmental pioneer’ to encompass 
business, civil society and regional actors alongside 
governments. The next two contributions look at the 
role of non-state actors in climate change governance 
at the EU level: Grant focusing on businesses, and 
Monaghan, Wurzel and Connelly on civil society actors. 
Fairbrass reports preliminary findings from on-going 
empirical research on UK-based businesses and their 
coalition-building activities in relation to climate 
change policy. Sullivan and Gouldson then discuss the 
findings of their research on voluntary climate change 
mitigation actions of UK supermarkets. The third and 
final section focuses on the local level. Jonas, Gibbs 
and While assess the ways in which competitiveness 
and green agendas of cities have become increasingly 
aligned. Two case studies which highlight the potential 
for alliances at the local level complete the report: the 
first case study by Hall reports research findings on 
the strategies and alliances in securing green growth in 
Hull; the second by Edwards details the climate change 
mitigation and adaptation challenges facing alliances in 
the Humber Estuary.
7New Climate Alliances
Much of the research discussed here remains on-going 
but a number of interim conclusions can be drawn at 
this stage:
— When analysing climate change governance 
the focus needs to be broadened from both the 
national level downwards to urban and regional 
scales and upwards to the supranational and 
international levels.
— Alliances can emerge and develop between 
different types of actors at both the same level/
scale and at different levels/scales.
— The role of the state at local and European levels 
can shape the formation of alliances.
— Notwithstanding the differences in the national 
and sub-national political contexts, transnational 
alliances may be able to draw lessons from other 
territories and thus diffuse climate change policy 
initiatives.
— European Union (EU) policy continues to 
influence climate alliances both nationally and  
in urban areas.
— There is a need to consider not only economically 
competitive cities but also a range of other 
places which are sometimes subject to structural 
challenges, and where new climate alliances are 
forming.
— Climate change and the low carbon economy form 
part of a wide range of competing pressures on the 
local and regional governance levels.
— Action can be initiated from within civil society as 
bottom-up initiatives and through profit-making 
motivations of ecologically innovative businesses 
as well as by governments and EU actors.
— Many businesses now take climate change 
seriously which they tend to perceive as both a 
threat and a business opportunity.
— New alliances between progressive businesses, 
civil society actors and citizens have emerged. 
However, they often remain fragile and open  
to defection.
The editors would like to thank all the participants 
of the European Climate Change Governance 
workshop in Hull in 2012 for their involvement and the 
discussions that informed some of these contributions. 
In particular they would like to thank the contributors 
to this volume. Thanks are also due to Richard Smith 
and Sarah Colenbrander of the Centre for Low Carbon 
Futures for their thoughtful comments on the drafts 
and for invaluable assistance in preparing the report 
for publication. The production of this report and parts 
of the research for it benefitted greatly from funding 
which was generously made available under the 
University of Hull research initiative, the Faculty of Arts 
and Social Sciences (FASS) Strategic Support Fund, 
and the British Academy/Leverhulme small grants 
scheme (SG131240).
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Pioneers revisited: 
broadening the  
pioneers concept 
in European Union 
environmental policy
Duncan Liefferink, Sietske Veenman and  
Mark Wiering, Radboud University  
Nijmegen, The Netherlands1
Nowadays most, if not all, of the former pioneer 
countries have become both more hesitant and more 
selective for a number of reasons. At the EU level, 
there has been a ‘dilution’ of the influence of individual 
Member States due to enlargement and to institutional 
changes, notably the almost total shift to the co-decision 
procedure (which allows for qualified majority voting 
amongst Member States in the Council and grants the 
European Parliament decision-making powers, which 
are equal to the Council). At least equally important 
are domestic developments within the former pioneers 
such as increasing Euro-scepticism, severe problems 
with the implementation of EU environmental 
directives, decreasing priority given to environmental 
and sustainability issues, and a shift to more right-wing 
governments. The place of pioneering governments 
seems to have been taken over, at least partly, by a wide 
range of other actors operating in shifting coalitions. 
This discussion explores how the roles of those new 
types of pioneers can be better understood. It first 
sketches out the original pusher/forerunner framework 
developed in the 1990s. It then explores how the 
concept of pioneers can be broadened to take into 
account a wider range of actors and a wider range of 
mechanisms employed in pursuing pioneer strategies. 
The final section attempts to outline a new, extended 
framework for analysing environmental pioneers  
in Europe.
Four types of environmental pioneers
The strategies of ‘green’ Member States operating in 
the 1990s could be distinguished along two dimensions 
(see Liefferink and Andersen, 1998 in further reading). 
First, a state could be a forerunner, i.e. having more 
advanced domestic policies than the other Member 
States, as either the consequence of a purposeful 
decision to take the lead, or the outcome of a more 
incremental, historical process. Second, these positions 
could be played out either by pushing the development 
of environmental policy in Brussels directly, or by 
exerting influence more indirectly, notably through the 
impact of higher domestic standards on the functioning 
of the internal market.
Scientific literature in the 1990s identified 
a small number of Member States 
(Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands) as ‘pioneers’ 
in EU environmental policy making. By 
being ahead of other Member States, 
by giving an example and by actively 
pushing the policy process in Brussels, 
they acted as important forces behind the 
development of EU environmental policy. 
1  Radboud University Nijmegen, Department of Political Sciences of the Environment, P.O. Box 9108, NL- 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 24 3612097 
(Liefferink) / +31 24 3615645 (Veenman) / +31 24 3615567 (Wiering). Fax: +31 24 3611841. E-mail: d.liefferink@fm.ru.nl / s.veenman@fm.ru.nl / m.wiering@fm.ru.nl.  
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The two distinctions combined lead to four ideal-type 
pioneers outlined in Table 1:
(a) Pusher by example: developing a domestic 
policy and presenting it as a ‘good example’ to 
be followed by the EU. In this strategy, conflicts 
with existing EU policies may be used to 
provoke EU action. 
(b) Constructive pusher: trying to stimulate the 
development of EU environmental policy by 
supporting the Commission, building alliances 
with other Member States, etc. 
(c) Defensive forerunner: developing a domestic 
policy that is known to be out of step with the 
EU and defending it against EU interference for 
domestic reasons. By affecting the functioning 
of the internal market, it may nevertheless have a 
considerable impact at the EU level. 
(d) Opt-outer: trying to maintain a domestic policy 
that has been developed without a view to the 
EU, i.e. a situation in which a Member State 
more or less unexpectedly finds itself out of step 
with the rest of the EU. Dependent on the issue 
at stake, that opting out may eventually have an 
EU impact via the internal market. 
New types of pioneers, new mechanisms?
Both domestic and EU-level changes have made the 
governments of the former pioneer states less eager to 
push environmental issues in Brussels than in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Instead – and reflecting trends towards 
increasing participation and stakeholder involvement 
in EU governance generally – other types of actors are 
increasingly involved in pushing EU environmental 
policies. These may be both sub-national governments 
(regions, provinces, cities, city networks etc.) and 
different types of non-state actors (business, business 
groups, NGOs, citizen groups etc.)3.  For instance, 
city networks are active in propagating innovative 
solutions in the area of climate change, firms anticipate 
on resource scarcity, or companies gathering in the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) urge for stricter and more consistent 
environmental policies. These developments pose the 
question: which strategies may such new pioneers be 
expected to employ?
On the one hand, sub-national public actors and most 
private actors have less formal and informal access to 
the EU institutions. Hence, they generally have fewer 
opportunities than Member State governments to 
engage in influencing the regulatory process directly 
by constructive pushing or actively presenting 
‘good examples’ in Brussels. Most of them also lack 
the capacity for such relatively resource-intensive 
lobbying strategies. On the other hand, they may have a 
considerable amount of freedom to develop innovative 
practices in their own specific fields of competence 
(for example in the case of sub-national authorities, 
in urban planning, sustainable building and so on), 
even if limitations set by the national and European 
regulatory context should not be underestimated. Thus, 
dependent on the policy area at stake, these actors 
may have better opportunities for developing policies 
Table 1: Four types of environmental pioneers2.
Forerunner:
Pusher:
Purposeful Incremental
Direct (a) Pusher by example (b) Constructive pusher
Indirect (c) Defensive forerunner (d) Opt-outer
2  Source: Liefferink, D. and Andersen, M.S. (1998), ‘Strategies of the “green” member states in EU environmental policy making’, Journal of European Public Policy 5 (2) 
pp254-70. 
3  See for example the other contributions to this volume by Grant, by Monaghan, Wurzel and Connelly, and by Sullivan and Gouldson for more detailed accounts of the roles 
of other types of ‘pioneers’.
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‘ahead of the others’ than Member State governments. 
This can be done with a focus on achieving local 
goals, irrespective of their impact on other actors (i.e. 
defensive forerunner) or with the explicit aim to set 
an example to others (i.e. pushing by example). In 
the latter case, the target would be other similar sub-
national actors (which may operate transnationally) 
rather than the EU.
If sub-national public actors or private actors engage in 
pushing by example or defensive forerunner strategies, 
several mechanisms may be at play. An indirect impact 
via the functioning of the internal market may of course 
not be ruled out, but various types of communication 
and policy learning are in fact likely to be much more 
important. Exchange of knowledge and practical 
experiences can take place in the context of, for 
instance, business associations, city networks, research 
programmes, consultancy firms or benchmarking 
exercises. It may lead to processes ranging from 
inspiration to copying and thus to diffusion of policy 
innovations. The cumulative effect of such processes 
may or may not eventually influence regulatory output 
at the EU level. Even if it does not, the impact on 
environmental policies and practices at national, sub-
national or company level may already be significant. 
Towards a new conceptualisation of 
environmental pioneers
The original, purely state-oriented pusher/forerunner 
matrix is limited to strategies and mechanisms 
related to either regulation or the market. It does 
not accommodate the potentially large role of 
communication and learning.  Therefore, as a starting 
point, we propose the scheme in Figure 1, which may 
have a wider applicability.
City networks  
are active in propagating  
innovative solutions in the 
area of climate change, firms 
anticipate on resource scarcity, 
and companies gathering  
in the World Business Council  
for Sustainable Development 
urge for stricter and more 
consistent environmental 
policies. 
Figure 1:  Pusher/forerunner strategies, 
mechanisms and policy impact at different levels.
Pusher by example
Opt-outer
Defensive forerunner
Constructive pusher
- Regulation
- Market 
- Communication  
and learning
Policies:
- EU policy
- national policy
- sub-national policy
- policies and practices  
of business, civil  
society and individual 
actors
 Strategies Mechanisms Policy levels
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The scheme makes a distinction between strategies 
(constructive pusher, pusher by example, etc.), 
mechanisms employed in pursuing these strategies 
(through regulation, market or communication and 
learning), and their impact on policies at different 
levels (EU, national and sub-national as well as private, 
civil society and individual). As hinted at above, 
different strategies in the hands of different actors may 
employ different configurations of mechanisms and 
target different levels. The particular ways in which 
this occurs has to be elaborated in further research. 
One hypothesis could be that constructive pushing, 
involving direct influence on the EU regulatory process, 
tends to be limited to Member State governments and 
a relatively small number of powerful companies and 
associations with good access in Brussels. Pushing 
by example and defensive forerunner strategies, in 
contrast, appear to be more relevant for sub-national 
governments or private and civil society actors acting as 
pioneers. Although effects via regulation or the market 
cannot be excluded, the key mechanism here seems 
to be communication and policy learning although 
more extensive empirical research is needed to test this 
hypothesis. Sub-national governments or private and 
civil society actors may also be expected to bring about 
policy change with their counterparts in city networks, 
business associations, etc., possibly before having a 
wider policy impact at the national or EU level.
Further reading
Andersen, M.S. and Liefferink, D. eds. (1997), 
European environmental policy: the pioneers. 
Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press.
Liefferink, D. and Wiering, M. (2011), 
‘Environmental pioneers in retreat? The cases of 
the Netherlands and Denmark’. Paper presented at 
the 6th ECPR General Conference, University of 
Iceland, Reykjavik, 25-27 August 2011, available at: 
http://moodle.tau.ac.il/pluginfile.php/260496/mod_
resource/content/0/Liefferink%20%20Wiering%20
2011.pdf, (visited 1 July 2013).
Liefferink, D. and Andersen, M.S. (1998), ‘Strategies 
of the “green” member states in EU environmental 
policy making’, Journal of European Public Policy 5 (2) 
pp254-70.
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It is possible to identify four broad reasons why 
businesses might be motivated to engage in new 
alliances to combat climate change:
1. Because they are directly concerned with 
providing equipment or services designed to 
mitigate climate change (e.g., manufacturers and 
installers of wind turbines).
2. Because they are concerned that they might suffer 
reputational damage and/or experience new 
taxes or greater regulation because of a failure to 
combat climate change.  The oil and motor vehicle 
industries come to mind here.
3. Because there is potential for efficiency gains, for 
example by reducing energy use, finding new uses 
for by-products, recycling or reducing energy 
consumption. This is essentially the ecological 
modernisation ‘win-win’ argument which, it has 
been claimed, amounts to the official ideology 
of the EU (see the contribution in this volume 
by Monaghan, Wurzel, and Connelly). In this 
respect, Sullivan and Gouldson argue in their 
contribution to this volume that the main driver for 
supermarkets has been a financial one.
4. Because they (or the industry to which they 
belong) are threatened in some way by climate 
change. The classic case is the insurance industry 
which faces both greater uncertainty and greater 
risk, making it more difficult to make predictable 
profits.  More generally, business has an interest in 
uncertainty reduction.
Drivers for business-led climate alliances
It could be hypothesised that an industry’s response is 
conditioned by how prosperous it is.  If one is making 
substantial and reliable profits, like the multinationals 
in the oil industry, it is relatively painless to devote some 
of that surplus to image-building efforts in relation to 
climate change. In contrast, civil aviation is an industry 
in which it is notoriously difficult to make profits 
because of the challenge of filling flights at more than 
a break-even price.  It could be argued that these profit 
pressures, along with a freedom from tax on its fuel, 
and a somewhat ‘gung ho’ philosophy in some parts of 
the industry, may explain why it has been particularly 
resistant to measures to deal with climate change. 
One further factor has to be added in to a tentative 
model.  The discussion up to now has been essentially 
structural, related to the characteristics of particular 
industries and how they might be affected by climate 
change. However, agency can also play a part.  
A particular chief executive may decide to prioritise 
combatting climate change and that will affect the 
company’s policies.
This discussion evaluates the extent 
to which there might be scope for new 
climate change alliances between business 
and civil society groups, particularly those 
concerned with the environment, at the 
EU level. Given that there is a literature 
that suggests that there are limits to 
what can be achieved by ‘command 
and control’ actions, which is not to 
say that regulation and enforcement is 
irrelevant, alliances between business and 
environmental groups might offer scope 
for real progress in terms of effective 
measures to mitigate climate change.   
They might also contribute to public 
awareness of the existence of the problem 
and the need to tackle it without delay 
and counter some of the arguments of 
those who are sceptical about man-made 
climate change.
New climate change 
alliances at the 
European Union  
level - business
Wyn Grant, University of Warwick, UK 4
4  Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, Tel.: +44-2476-523720, Email: w.p.grant@warwick.ac.uk.
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One can make a distinction between a small group of 
evangelical companies such as Unilever, Philips or 
Marks & Spencer for whom sustainability is a belief 
system, often driven by a CEO’s views on long-term 
trends such as resource scarcity (see also Fairbrass in 
this volume). Then there are ‘sustainability capitalists’ 
such as General Electric or Siemens, which invest in 
ventures such as wind energy or technology to make 
water use more efficient because they see short-term 
growth opportunities.  They are opportunists rather 
than advocates.
Paul Polman, the chief executive of Unilever, argues 
that companies have to act because of the looming 
strain of resource scarcity, coupled with the pressure of 
climate change and in the face of politicians held back 
by short-termism from undertaking effective policy 
initiatives5.   This gives companies a unique opportunity 
to take the responsibility to offer solutions. They have 
to act because the policy space is not being adequately 
filled by government (see also the contribution by 
Liefferink, Veenman and Wiering in this volume). 
This has become more of an issue as the EU has 
understandably become increasingly preoccupied 
with finding solutions to the Eurozone crisis, another 
consequence of which is that public funds for 
environmental measures are necessarily constrained in 
a time of austerity.
Further positive externalities may be created when 
global businesses such as Nestlé and Unilever decide to 
make their substantial supply chains as environmentally 
sound as possible. These in turn may underpin 
new alliances.  Unilever reckons it has 1.3 million 
smallholders linked into its supply chain. It is focusing 
on agricultural training which it is hoped will improve 
sustainability emphasising that a focus on climate 
change resilience requires companies to be aware of the 
whole value chain, including workers.
In the United States we have seen the emergence 
of Ceres – a formal coalition of 130 investors and 
environmental groups. Ceres had its origins in the 
Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989 and includes among its 
members some of the leading environmental groups 
such as the Natural Resources Defense Council and 
the Sierra Group, along with churches, while the public 
pensions system in California appears to be a big player 
and is a potential source of pressure on companies. 
Another big business-led formal player is the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) in arguing for stricter and more consistent 
environmental policies (see also Liefferink, Veenman 
and Wiering who refer to the role of the WBCSD in 
their contribution to this volume).  A further source 
of pressure for change is coming from some stock 
exchanges through the Sustainable Stock Exchange 
Initiative, a UN-backed group.
Limits to business-led climate change alliances
There are, however, limitations in the extent to which 
business can lead alliances aimed at tackling climate 
change. It may be that formal coalitions of the type that 
include Ceres and the WBCSD are a step too  
far, particularly for some top-rank companies, as they 
can entangle them in commitments that go beyond 
what they feel able to do or are difficult to disengage 
from. More ad-hoc coalitions with environmental 
groups on specific issues, which appears to be the 
favoured European model, may be seen as a better  
way to proceed.
In the context of the US it is also important to take 
account of global initiatives such as sustainability 
reporting as was discussed in the UN Rio 20 plus 
summit. Two-thirds of companies that do not report 
are in the US, and the US government has resisted 
moves in this direction. By contrast such schemes have 
the backing of many European companies: indeed, 
the UK included the insurer Aviva in its delegation. 
Aviva argues that more information on environmental 
impact is vital for shareholders as it can have material 
consequences for companies’ financial results.    
5  Quoted in Clark, P. ‘Environment: Capitalist conservationists’, Financial Times, 4 June 2012.
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Challenges and future developments
Clearly, there are a series of a practical challenges. 
However, many far-sighted companies are recognising 
the long-run implications of climate change for their 
profits and even their ability to do business at all. 
This necessarily encourages them to enter into a 
dialogue with environmental groups as part of the 
search for sustainable solutions. As Sullivan and 
Gouldson show in their contribution to this report, 
windows of opportunity may occur.  When the views of 
stakeholders align, the resultant pressure may be greater 
than the sum of the parts.  This happened in the UK 
supermarket sector in 2005-7 when media, consumer 
and NGO attention was being paid to climate change.
Finally, it takes two to tango. If environmental groups 
are seen to be unrealistic or intransigent in their 
demands, a company may be unwilling to continue 
to build a relationship with them.  It’s an exchange 
relationship and businesses need to gain something 
from it. More research is needed, including case studies, 
to map the extent of relationships of this kind what both 
parties gain from them and how they contribute to 
mitigating climate change.
Although John Sauven of Greenpeace UK argues, 
“When you look at individual corporate behaviour, you 
do see some quite significant changes.”  Greenpeace 
continues to confront companies when their behaviour 
is seen to be unacceptable. Recently it has been in a 
row with JBS, the world’s biggest exporter of meat, 
over a report in which Greenpeace accused JBS of 
sourcing beef from farms in the Amazon basin that fail 
to comply with environmental laws including those 
relating to deforestation. In turn JBS has threatened to 
sue Greenpeace over the report which has already cost 
it its business with Tesco (for more information about 
environmental NGOs see also the contribution by 
Monaghan, Wurzel and Connelly in this volume).
It has to be recognised that the corporate sustainability 
drive may be fragile.  For its own part, Tesco retreated 
from a plan to put carbon footprint labels on products, 
advanced in 2007 before the global financial  
crisis. There is also, of course, the risk of greenwash;  
of public relations initiatives that lack real substance.  
The ultimate objective of companies is to make a  
profit and many resist any initiatives that lead to  
greater external intervention, bureaucracy and 
regulation. There is the risk of diluting EU initiatives  
to meet business concerns to the extent that they are  
no longer effective. 
The commitment of a company to alliance building 
may be dependent on the personal commitment of a 
chief executive officer or other senior office holder. If 
that person leaves, the commitment may disappear. 
A change in ownership may undermine prior 
commitments.  Ben Richardson suggests that this may 
have happened when Tate & Lyle’s sugar division was 
sold to American Sugar Refining in 2010:  
“Quite possibly, the new owners have decided that 
‘being seen to be good, … is not a sufficient business 
priority.” Finally, the pool of green champions among 
companies is, of course, still very small. They are 
estimated to make up only about 1% of companies with 
revenues above $1 billion.
Further reading
Dunn, S. (2002) ‘Down to Business on Climate  
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Greener Management International, 39(3) pp27-41.
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room?’ in Wurzel, R. and Connelly, J. eds, The 
European Union as a Leader in International Climate 
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A relatively wide range of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have – in a relatively short space of 
time – emerged to become important 
actors in EU climate change governance. 
This discussion examines the range of 
societal organisations, which represent 
environmental and social interests in EU 
climate change governance, the alliances 
that have emerged, and the factors 
underpinning these alliances. Moreover, 
it also aims to shed some light on the 
implications of these developments for 
democratic and effective EU climate 
change governance.
The emergence of civil society actors in EU 
climate change politics
Although the active involvement of interest groups has 
been seen as an increasingly important feature of EU 
policy-making, on an international level climate change 
has generally been viewed as a matter for states and 
intergovernmental bargaining. Traditionally only states 
have legal personality in international law and are thus 
capable of entering into international (climate change) 
treaties. However, after initial resistance, especially from 
newly independent states, the EU has been recognised 
as an actor which can sign international treaties. Most 
environmental treaties (including the Kyoto Protocol 
that deals with the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions) for which the EU is a signatory are so-called 
mixed agreements which have been signed by both the 
EU and its member states. 
Alongside the EU institutions, societal actors have 
played an important role in EU climate change 
governance as well as, although to a lesser degree, in 
international climate change politics. In the past some 
EU member states (e.g. Sweden) even embedded 
NGO representatives into their national delegations 
in the UN climate change negotiations. The Brussels-
based environmental NGOs (ENGOs) have played 
an especially prominent role in lobbying on EU 
climate change policy. Some of these actors are well-
established. The European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB) set up its office in Brussels in 1974 and since 
then its membership has risen to more than 140 groups 
from more than 30 European countries. In the 1980s 
Friends of the Earth (FoE), Greenpeace, World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and Climate Action Network 
(CAN) all set up European offices in Brussels. The 
European offices of the EEB, FoE, Greenpeace and 
WWF quickly cooperated closely within the ‘Gang of 
Four’ or ‘G4’ (a parody of the G7 meetings held by the 
then ‘great seven powers’). Since the late 1980s climate 
change as a specific environmental issue became a 
major campaign issue for the Brussels-based ENGOs. 
They decided to pool their resources and coordinate 
their strategies in the run up to the 1992 United 
Nations (UN) Rio conference because of limited staff 
and financial resources and a huge work load. The 
G4 gradually grew into the G10 (now known as the 
Green 10), comprising BirdLife International, CAN 
Europe, CEE Bankwatch Network, EEB, Health and 
Environment Alliance (HEAL) Environment Network, 
FoE Europe, Greenpeace Europe, International 
Friends of Nature (INF), Transport & Environment 
(T&E), and WWF Europe. Of these, CAN Europe, 
FoE Europe, Greenpeace and WWF quickly developed 
into the most important environmental NGO players 
for EU climate change policy.
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signal consensus over their positions and demonstrate 
widespread support within broader European society. 
For their parts, the EU institutions, particularly the 
Commission in its role of initiator of EU policy, have 
favoured contacts with organisations that can claim 
a broad perspective and have therefore encouraged 
the formation of European-wide organisations and 
umbrella groups. Some MEPs are also very open to 
environmental NGO lobbying7. 
Co-ordination between NGOs in EU climate change 
politics is facilitated by the fact that, despite their 
heterogeneity, many of them have similar goals; this 
makes it easier to form coalitions. There also tends 
not to be so marked a distinction between moderate 
reformist environmental groups (typically adopting 
‘insider’ lobbying strategies), and more radical so-called 
‘deep green’ environmental groups (often adopting 
‘outsider’ lobbying strategies. Brussels has been widely 
referred to as an ‘insider’s town’ where moderate and 
consensus strategies are more effective than extreme 
or disruptive practices, although many Brussels-based 
NGOs argue that insider and outside strategies are not 
mutually exclusive.
In addition to co-operation between NGOs, there 
have also been some alliances between NGOs and 
business, challenging the traditional assumptions that 
social and environmental interests are necessarily 
opposed to corporate interests, as outlined by Grant, 
in this volume. Instead certain NGOs in Brussels 
have found it useful to join forces with, for example, 
environmentally progressive businesses (e.g. the 
renewable energy industry). The rationale for such 
alliances is sometimes underpinned by the concept of 
ecological modernisation which posits that ambitious 
environmental (and climate change) policies are 
beneficial for both the environment and the economy. 
Climate change has developed into a cross-cutting 
policy of major political importance, which has 
attracted the interest not only of traditional ENGOs 
but also other organisations not hitherto associated 
with the issue. Especially in the run up to the 2010 UN 
Copenhagen climate change conference, development 
NGOs (such as Oxfam) became involved in climate 
change lobbying activities while forming temporary 
alliances with traditional ENGOs in Brussels. Think-
tanks have emerged as another prominent non-state 
actor on climate change issues with several of the large 
Brussels-based organisations (including the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS), European 
Policy Centre (EPC), Friends of Europe, and Bruegel) 
running climate-focused activities. Some European 
foundations produce research and analysis, or 
otherwise provide funding for NGOs. The European 
Climate Foundation (ECF) which is the most 
important funding source also tries to help organise an 
overall climate change lobbying strategy between the 
different Brussels-based ENGOs. Consultancies such 
as Fleischman Hillard, Grayling and Milieu, and law 
firms, specifically Client Earth, have also been active. 
Finally, a number of local and regional associations, 
Eurocities being the prime example, have involved 
themselves in European climate change politics issues. 
The term ‘NGO’, therefore, masks a considerable range 
and variety of non-state actors. 
The on-going and constitutive activity of alliance-
building characterises the interactions of the actors. 
Indeed, some of the most active organisations can be 
understood as formalised alliances between various 
national and sectoral groups. The ‘Green 10’ is, as 
highlighted above, an alliance of ten of the biggest 
ENGOs in Brussels. Alliances are often informal and  
ad hoc, a feature facilitated by the fact that ENGOs 
have developed a close climate change ‘community’  
in Brussels.
ENGOs find it useful to make alliances for a number 
of reasons. Most Brussels-based NGOs have relatively 
small offices with few staff and meagre resources, 
especially by comparison with large companies (see 
also the contribution by Grant in this volume).  
Co-ordination can lead to economies of scale, allowing 
organisations to pool resources, co-ordinate strategies, 
and avoid duplication. Intense competition for funding, 
supporters, media and public attention is less marked 
at the EU than the national level and therefore does 
not constitute a strong barrier to co-operation. In 
addition to its practical benefits, co-ordination also 
increases the chances of being taken seriously by EU 
institutions, as organisations acting collectively can 
7  Friedrich, T. and Wurzel, R. (2000), ‘A New Approach to EU Environmental Policy-making? The Auto-Oil I Programme’, Journal of European Public Policy,  
7 (4) pp593-612.
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Civil society organisations, climate change politics 
and EU governance
Since the 1990s, social and environmental actors have 
been expected to help contribute to EU governance, 
not only in the delivery of technical expertise and 
the creation of effective policy outcomes, but also in 
enhancing policy inputs by representing the voices of 
society and by mobilising support amongst European 
publics. This is particularly important in the context of 
climate change because of the EU’s commitments as 
a signatory of the Aarhus Convention, which obliges 
authorities to inform and enhance the participation of 
citizens in the formulation of environmental policy.
However, in this respect civil society organisations 
face a number of challenges. First there is an emphasis 
on the ways in which groups utilise their membership 
structures to link citizens with EU politics. The Green 
10 invokes this logic in its claim to reflect the views of 
20 million citizens through its member organisations. 
However, it should be noted that only some of the 
societal actors in EU climate change politics can be 
characterised as membership organisations: some 
have members who merely pay subscription fees in 
exchange for certain informational and advocacy 
benefits rather than to participate in civic engagement; 
and others have no individual members at all. Even 
when an organisation has members there are often long 
chains of delegation between individual citizens and 
the Brussels-based organisation. Secondly, some of the 
above-mentioned organisations have very weak or non-
existent grassroots foundations. Rather than formalised 
expressions of interests previously latent in society,  
the emergence of some of these groups arguably 
owes more to top-down formal and informal alliances 
between elites – in both the organisations and the EU 
institutions – than to  spontaneous, voluntary, bottom-
up civic engagement. Thirdly, some groups fail to 
facilitate the participation of ordinary members or 
citizens. Although many Brussels-based organisations 
claim that they have procedures for (and a regular 
practice of) consulting their membership, what 
sometimes happens is that organisations anticipate 
or simply assume the preferences of their members 
because on most issues members will have little interest 
or will lack the expertise or resources to have an 
informed opinion. 
Despite these challenges, civil society organisations 
have the potential to play a significant role in EU 
climate change governance. Realising this potential 
depends in part on the groups themselves as well as 
supporters and the EU institutions having an informed 
understanding of the capacities and willingness to 
engage in these areas.
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agenda whilst their opponents adopt and promote 
alternative perspectives such as a ‘green agenda’ or ‘fair 
trade’ or poverty eradication. Crucially, many observers 
believe that business interests are the ‘victors’ in this 
competition due to their superior resource-base. It 
may be for this reason that businesses, in the past, may 
not have had a powerful incentive to create alliances 
with other non-governmental actors – having no 
need – although they appear to have realised the value 
of building partnerships with governmental bodies. 
However, it is important to highlight that in recent 
years, we have witnessed a growing engagement on the 
part of individual business – both small and large – with 
the issue of sustainability and climate change. For many 
this is part of their shift towards strategic corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programmes, developed in 
response to a growing pressure from their increasingly 
vociferous private, public and third-sector stakeholders 
(see also Sullivan and Gouldson in this volume). 
As a result, the evidence shows that some firms find 
themselves, willingly or grudgingly, making common 
cause with national and international public authorities 
and with environmental and social groups in seeking 
to combat climate change. Whilst relatively little few 
studies have examined the possibility of or the actuality 
of joint action between businesses and other actors, 
some recent research has uncovered alliances between 
business interests, environmental groups and others.
This discussion presents some of the findings of recent 
research into the interest representation behaviour of 
UK-based business in relation to climate change policy 
and the motivations underpinning this and it assesses 
the extent to which businesses have engaged in any 
coalition- or alliance-building and their perceptions 
on this activity. The research outlined here comprises 
two main components: two large-scale postal surveys 
of the top 250 UK-registered companies and elite 
interviewing of business, government and non-
governmental bodies 9. 
Traditionally, business and other non-governmental 
actors (such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and 
others outlined in the contribution of Monaghan, 
Wurzel and Connelly to this volume) are considered to 
be adversaries in relation to public policy and policy-
making in most areas of public life – including that of 
climate change policy and governance. That is, they 
have not been seen to be ‘natural allies’ and where 
they do work together, could be said to be ‘strange 
bedfellows’ (see also the contribution by Grant in this 
volume). This assessment has come about because we 
can observe business interests and their challengers 
actively (some might say ruthlessly) competing for 
access to, the attention of, and influence over public 
policy makers. In several areas of public life such rivalry 
appears to be directly born out of differing world-views 
and conflicting interests, given that many business 
organisations openly espouse a neo-liberal economic 
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Climate change action: perceptions on the role of 
business
The first postal survey established the wider 
background to the research about CSR and climate 
change by gathering data about the participating 
firms’ underlying assumptions, views and objectives. 
Respondents were asked if they perceived climate 
change to be ‘a major economic, social and 
environmental problem’. All fifty-two (100% of the 
respondents) confirmed that they supported this view. 
When asked whether they saw action to combat climate 
change as part of the corporate social responsibility of 
a business organisation, the overwhelming majority 
(94.2%) answered in the affirmative. In many respects 
these responses were predictable, particularly because 
the composition of the respondent group was largely 
made up from senior managers whose organisational 
role focuses on CSR or environmental issues. 
Delving further into the issue of the role of business 
organisations in relation to combating climate change, 
respondents were also asked to identify what sort of 
role they thought firms should play in this regard.  
Half of the respondents stated that firms should play 
a ‘leading role’, whilst a sizeable proportion stated 
that they thought that businesses should adopt a 
‘partnership role’ along with other policy actors such 
as governmental bodies and other non-state actors. See 
Table 2 below for details.
When asked further about the role(s) of government or 
public bodies, the majority of the respondents did not 
think that public authorities (such as central or local 
government) should have the ‘primary responsibility’ 
for combating climate change.  Over half stated that 
they did not think that the public sector should have 
such responsibility. This is consistent with the data 
above where a large percentage of the firms indicated 
that they should be the organisations that should take a 
leading role in combating climate change.  See Table 3 
for details.
Having established background business views, the 
next step in the research project was the administration 
of a second postal survey. This focused specifically 
on the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, which further explored the 
businesses’ attitudes and motivations. Respondents 
were asked whether they had participated in national 
and international climate change policy formulation 
prior to the COP-15 meeting in Copenhagen. Of those 
that replied, the majority had made contact with the 
UK government, either directly or via an intermediary. 
This compares to lower figures for contact with EU 
level public bodies and the UN. See Tables 4, 5 and 6 for 
further details.
Table 2: What is the role of business organisations in combating climate change?
Frequency Percent
 Valid Leading 26 50.0
Supporting 4 7.7
Equal partnership 21 40.4
No data 1 1.9
Total 52 100.0
Source: Postal survey 2008-9
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Table 4: Contact with UK government.
Frequency Percent
 Valid Direct contact 15 55.6
Via intermediary 3 11.1
No contact 9 33.3
Total 27 100.0
Source: Postal survey 2010
Table 5: Contact with EU bodies.
Frequency Percent
 Valid Direct contact 5 18.5
Via intermediary 4 14.8
No contact 18 66.7
Total 27 100.0
Source: Postal survey 2010
Table 3:  Should the public sector have primary responsibility for combating climate change?
Frequency Percent
 Valid Yes 19 36.5
No 29 55.8
Don’t know 2 3.8
No data 2 3.8
Total 52 100.0
Source: Postal survey 2008-9
Table 6: Contact with UN or international bodies.
Frequency Percent
 Valid Direct contact 7 25.9
Via intermediary 3 11.1
No contact 17 63.0
Total 27 100.0
Source: Postal survey 2010
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The data are particularly revealing yet consistent 
with previous research about businesses’ interest 
representation targets and routes. It suggests a greater 
use of direct contact with national policy makers and 
the preference for using intermediaries when seeking 
to contact EU or international bodies. These choices 
or decisions tend to be driven by the availability 
of both tangible (such as financial strength) and 
intangible resources (such as expertise) of the business 
organisations, along with their assessment about which 
governmental body is the most likely to be a ‘worthwhile 
target’ in terms of the returns or rewards (i.e. influence) 
that might be reaped from contact with them. Where 
the respondents did target the UK government, not 
surprisingly, the most often named government 
department was the Department for Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) followed by the Department 
for Transport, the Department for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)  and the department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). A similar 
pattern emerged in terms of the EU, in so far as 
those that contacted EU level bodies focused on DG 
Environment and DG TREN within the European 
Commission.  
In the second survey respondents were also asked 
to identify their main objectives with regard to 
participation in policy formation prior to December 
2009.  The most frequently cited objective was to 
‘influence policy’ closely followed by wanting to 
‘demonstrate industry leadership’. The next most 
often mentioned objectives were to seek ‘regulation’ 
and ‘share good practice’. The least cited objective was 
to ‘gain information and understanding’ of the policy 
area. To shed further light on the firm’s objectives, 
the respondents were given the space to comment in 
more detail. Answers pointed to the importance of 
having clarity and some degree of long-term certainty 
about the regulatory and policy environment, for the 
purposes of making investments. 
Perceptions of coalition-building
Subsequent elite interviewing with business, 
government and NGO staff revealed a distinct 
appetite for coalition-building in relation to climate 
change public policy-making. Even though business 
managers could clearly point to a number of possible 
problems and obstacles, those interviewed were keen 
to emphasise the pay-offs. They stressed their desire 
to create strong policy-making alliances with both 
(national) governments and national/international 
non-state actors pointing to the benefits for themselves 
and their potential allies. They also indicated that there 
had been changes in the ways that they related to NGOs 
over time. For example, one large energy company 
described their relations with NGOs in relation to 
climate change policy in the following terms:
“I think it’s fair to say that, historically, we were […] 
picking and choosing which NGOs we would speak to 
on the basis of some would be more open […] and we saw 
[that] others would never agree with us […] now it’s a 
case of bringing people together and saying:  Well, these 
are our problems. Do you have any solutions? And, can 
we help you find solutions to your issues? There’s now 
actually a proper engagement process going on.”  
(Energy Company, 2010).
So, whilst business and others (such as environmental 
pressure groups) may have been thought of as ‘strange 
bedfellows’ in the past, the lobbying landscape in 
this policy area looks as though it will be increasingly 
characterised by groups of businesses and other societal 
groups working for a common cause and becoming 
‘natural allies’ with respect to climate change issues. 
Further reading
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Over the past five years, interest has 
grown in the contribution that companies 
can make to reducing global greenhouse 
gas emissions. This interest has been 
driven by the significant proportion of  
the world’s greenhouse gas emissions  
that can be attributed, directly or 
indirectly, to companies’ activities, 
and has been further encouraged by 
the increasing number of companies 
that have set targets to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions.
This discussion, using evidence from 
the UK supermarket sector, analyses 
the potential contribution that 
voluntary corporate action can make to 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, 
and offers some reflections on the 
governance interventions that are likely 
to drive continuing improvements in the 
performance of the corporate sector. 
The case of the UK supermarkets’ response to 
climate change
The response of the UK supermarket sector to climate 
change is important for two reasons. First, the sector 
has a significant carbon footprint; its direct emissions 
(i.e. from operations, electricity consumption and 
transport) account for almost 1% of the UK’s total 
greenhouse gas emissions, and its indirect emissions are 
estimated to be an order of magnitude higher. Second, 
while certain aspects of the sector’s impacts (e.g. 
transport emissions, building energy efficiency) are the 
subject of detailed regulation, the sector’s greenhouse 
gas emissions as a whole have not been heavily 
regulated. As such, the sector provides an intriguing 
case-study of how corporate action might evolve in the 
absence of strong governmental action.
The UK supermarkets’ climate change strategies 
have evolved significantly over the past 10-15 years 
(see also the contribution from Grant in this volume). 
The late 1990s through to the early-mid 2000s were 
marked by companies professionalising their approach 
to environmental management, including publishing 
environmental (subsequently corporate social 
responsibility – CSR – or sustainability) reports and 
setting performance improvement targets.  
From the mid-2000s, the emphasis on climate  
change increased with companies starting to set three 
to five year (as opposed to annual) targets for their 
operations and activities, albeit with the focus of these 
targets continuing to be on relative rather than  
absolute performance. 
From 2007 onwards, the supermarkets started to place 
much greater emphasis on absolute emission reduction 
targets, with many starting to look at wider supply chain 
and value chain-related emissions. For example,  
Marks & Spencer committed to making its UK and 
Republic of Ireland operations carbon neutral by 2012, 
and to working with its customers and suppliers to help 
reduce their emissions. Similarly, Tesco committed 
to reducing its own carbon footprint and to working 
with its suppliers and other organisations to deliver 
significant greenhouse gas emission reductions across 
the supply chain. 
In terms of performance, since the late 1990s/early 
2000s the retailers have managed to consistently 
improve their energy intensity by between 2 and 3% 
per annum11.  This performance compares favourably 
to the annual improvements in UK economy-wide 
energy intensity (measured in energy intensity per unit 
of GDP) of approximately 2% per annum. However, 
in virtually all cases, absolute energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions have continued to rise, as a 
result of business growth and business changes.
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Drivers for action
Companies in the supermarket sector divide the drivers 
for action on climate change into those where there is 
a financial case for action and those where the benefits 
are ‘non-financial’ or, more precisely, where the benefits 
(e.g. brand, stakeholder relationships) are difficult to 
capture purely in financial terms.
The majority of actions that have been taken to reduce 
energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions 
(in particular, those that involved significant capital 
investment or significant organisational resources) can 
be explained by considering the financial costs and 
the benefits of the actions taken. This does not mean 
that companies do not get other benefits from these 
actions (e.g. PR benefits from badging energy saving 
programmes as climate change initiatives), but these 
benefits are frequently ancillary to the primary financial 
drivers for action.
While the different companies have broadly similar 
expectations in terms of the rate of return (or payback 
periods) that they expect from their investments in 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions and energy 
efficiency, the business case analysis conducted by 
individual companies is strongly affected by their 
internal governance processes; by their beliefs and 
values; by their views on the current and future business 
landscape; by their capacity, and by their historic 
approach to and experience with energy efficiency and 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts. Within 
this, one of the most important findings from our 
research is that companies that have experimented 
with energy saving technologies and have tested 
different approaches to energy saving and emissions 
management are likely to have a greater range of tested 
and proven options available to them. In the case of 
the UK supermarket sector, a number of the large 
supermarkets have committed significant time and 
resources to developing green stores and to intensively 
testing energy saving technologies in buildings and in 
transport. This has enabled them to develop significant 
competence and knowledge in energy management, 
as well as detailed cost curves for a whole variety 
of technologies and approaches. It has also given 
them access to a whole series of energy saving and 
greenhouse gas emission reduction opportunities  
that they can progressively deploy across their  
entire businesses.
Turning to non-financial drivers for action, the 
reality is that pressures from individual stakeholders 
for retailers to take action on climate change remain 
relatively modest. However, there is evidence that when 
the views of different stakeholders align (i.e. where 
they have a consistent message, when they express 
their views at the same time, when they maintain the 
pressure for a significant amount of time, when they 
have a degree of clarity about the actions that they 
expect companies to take), the pressure that can be 
exerted is frequently much greater than that of each 
of the stakeholders in isolation. This was seen most 
clearly in the period 2005-2007, which saw significant 
media, consumer and NGO attention being paid 
to the issue of climate change, the publication of 
both the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change and the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the 
introduction of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
This alignment of pressures was critical in encouraging 
the UK supermarket sector as a whole to significantly 
strengthen its focus on climate change. 
Companies that  
have experimented with  
energy saving technologies 
and have tested different 
approaches to energy saving 
and emissions management 
are likely to have a greater 
range of tested and proven 
options available  
to them.
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About the Non-State Actors and the Low Carbon 
Economy Project
The material presented here is based on information 
gathered as part of a wider project, Non-State Actors 
and the Low Carbon Economy, being run by the 
ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and 
Policy (a joint initiative between the University of 
Leeds and the London School of Economics). The 
project, which runs from 2010 - 2013, examines how 
corporate climate change performance has been 
influenced by non-state actors such as environmental 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), investors, 
employees and customers. 
Governance implications
The empirical evidence from the UK supermarket 
sector develops our understanding of the relationship 
between governance and CSR in a number of areas.
The first is that corporate behaviour is most frequently 
driven by analysis of the business case, and so 
governance interventions that alter the economics of 
investment decisions are critical. Of course, we need 
to acknowledge that the limits to action based on 
the business case are continually changing, and that 
fluctuating energy prices, advancing technologies and 
accumulated learning can all shape the business case.  
The second is that while there is limited evidence 
that non-financial interventions alter the rates of 
return that are sought from investments in energy 
efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions reductions, 
these interventions are hugely important in focusing 
company attention on relevant issues and in stimulating 
the development of organisational capacity and 
potential investment opportunities. 
The third is that different governance pressures 
conspire to shape outcomes. Even though it can be very 
difficult to predict the influence or impact of specific 
governance interventions, the alignment of different 
governance pressures is hugely important. While 
companies may be able to ignore individual pressures 
(e.g. a particular NGO campaign), where different 
pressures (e.g. from NGOs, consumers, the media) are 
aligned, the likelihood that companies will respond is 
significantly increased. 
The fourth is that the vast majority of the 
improvements that have been achieved are based 
almost exclusively on incremental change and 
improved efficiency. Our research suggests that 
the boundaries of the business case and the limits 
of incremental change can be extended through 
learning and capacity building, but the reality is that 
if the business case dries up or if the opportunities for 
incremental change are exhausted, the scope for further 
progress is likely to be restricted. At present, there are 
very few signs that any of the retailers are considering 
radical changes in their business models, and none of 
them seem to see any alternative to business growth. 
Further reading
Gouldson, A. and Sullivan, R. (2013), ‘Long-term 
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Deliver?’, Environmental Science & Policy, 27 (March 
2013), pp1-10.
Gouldson, A. and Sullivan, R. (2012), ‘Ecological 
Modernisation and the Spaces for Feasible Action on 
Climate Change’, in Pelling, M., Manuel-Navarrete, 
D., and Redclift, M. eds. (2012), Climate Change and 
the Crisis of Capitalism, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 
pp114-125.
Sullivan, R. and Gouldson, A. (2012), ‘Does 
Voluntary Carbon Reporting Meet Investors’ 
Needs?’, Journal of Cleaner Production, 36, pp60-67.
Sullivan, R. and Gouldson, A. (2013), ‘Ten Years of 
Corporate Action on Climate Change: What Do We 
Have to Show for it?’, Energy Policy. http://dx.doi.
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Research on urban environmental 
issues has frequently drawn attention to 
tensions between economic development 
and environmental goals. Whether it is 
local opposition to wastewater treatment 
facilities or the impact of urban sprawl 
on greenbelt land, urban economic 
development often seems to go hand-
in-hand with environmental conflict 
and protest. Yet increasingly there are 
strong economic and political incentives 
for cities to become greener and 
cleaner, despite the potential for intense 
conflict especially when environmental 
regulation is felt to constrain economic 
competitiveness. There is now plenty 
of evidence that major cities, such as 
Barcelona in north east Spain, are seeking 
to integrate environmental and social 
sustainability principles into the provision 
of urban infrastructure and tourism, 
suggesting that competitive cities can also 
be green cities.
 
Indeed, the period since the 1970s has seen a concerted 
expansion of the scope and scale of state environmental 
regulation into many aspects of society and governance 
in cities across the world. Yet if anything the extension 
of environmental regulation has been characterised 
by its weakness and flexibility. In many respects urban 
sustainability goals have been secondary to promoting 
the economic competitiveness of cities. This is despite 
the recent flourishing of urban environmentalism 
in the form of growth control, environmental 
justice campaigns and green urban living. Urban 
environmentalism can – and should – be integral to 
the competitiveness of cities, but this in turn means 
thinking about urban competitiveness differently from 
the prevailing norms of urban governance in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, which tended to focus upon narrow 
conceptions of economic advantage from a neo-liberal 
perspective. So how can competitive cities become 
carbon neutral and green, and what are the implications 
of this transition for new climate alliances in cities?
Figure 2: Barcelona’s bicycle sharing scheme, 
Bicing, is indicative of recent efforts to green  
the competitive city (photo © Andy Jonas)
Greening the  
competitive city:  
climate alliances  
and urban low-carbon 
transitions
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12 Jonas and Gibbs: Department of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Kingston-upon-Hull, HU6 7RX, United Kingdom, 
Tel.: +44 1482 465268 (Jonas), +44 1482 465330 (Gibbs), Fax: +44 1482 466340, Email: A.E.Jonas@hull.ac.uk, D.C.Gibbs@hull.ac.uk, While: Department of Town and 
Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S10 2TN, Tel.: +44 114 228164, Email: A.H.while@sheffield.ac.uk.
New Climate Alliances26
respond to the challenges and opportunities of urban 
low-carbon restructuring and what this might mean for 
new alliances around urban competitiveness strategies. 
Reflecting the drift towards market rationalities in wider 
governance systems, research on urban low-carbon 
restructuring initially focused on the willingness of 
politicians and growth regimes to act on climate change 
mitigation, with low-carbon initiatives being mainly 
about a moral concern for global climate change.  
There has also been interest in how cities market 
themselves as environmentally friendly and carbon 
neutral. However, attention has now turned to whether 
cities have the capacity to act on what is a pressing and 
necessary economic and social imperative. In a post-
neoliberal era, cities now see the development of new 
alliances around low carbon futures as a necessary first 
step towards becoming more competitive. 
Urban climate alliances and urban low-carbon 
transitions
Although there are powerful arguments that investment 
in low-carbon transitions in the present will be cost 
effective – and environmentally and socially beneficial 
– in the longer-term, the low-carbon retrofitting of cities 
will require significant upfront financial investment 
and a potential extension of state intervention in 
production, consumption and mobility. Crucially, the 
imperative for extended urban intervention sits uneasily 
with some of the broader currents of neo-liberal state 
restructuring, including the urban impacts of utility 
privatisation and liberalisation, the unbundling of urban 
services, the rolling back of state intervention, fiscal 
retrenchment and resulting regulatory deficits in post-
Keynesian governance. In the case of the privatisation 
and unbundling of utility infrastructure this has not 
only widened socio-spatial inequalities within and 
between cities, it has complicated investment decisions, 
and made it more difficult for cities to co-ordinate and 
cross-subsidise across different aspects of public policy 
and retain the returns on growth and investment.
Climate governance: rethinking urban 
competitiveness?
The strategic context for urban governance is changing 
as climate change and the transition to low carbon 
economies exert growing influence over policy and 
investment priorities. On the climate mitigation side, 
global urban competition is increasingly associated 
with a raft of new development strategies and urban 
development projects broadly packaged under the 
theme of climate neutral, zero-emissions and outright 
carbon reduction. In cities at the forefront of inter-
urban competition the urban political arena is fast 
becoming populated with innovative concepts and 
planning principles such as post-carbon transitions, 
low-carbon lifestyles, zero-carbon building, carbon 
footprints and so on. Carbon control in this sense 
signals the political imperative of low-carbon 
restructuring as a first order policy priority for 
governments, businesses and, crucially, cities too. 
A simple explanation for the urbanisation of climate 
governance is down to the fact that the majority of the 
world’s population lives in cities; but in addition, cities – 
especially the mega-urban agglomerations – underpin 
global economic competitiveness. So, if climate policy 
is increasingly urbanised and energy security becomes 
a growing urban concern for city leaders, then failure 
to invest in urban low-carbon energy transitions 
carries the risk of penalties for non-compliance with 
carbon reduction targets, added costs for citizens 
and business arising from carbon taxes, rising energy 
prices and falling behind in circuits of low-carbon 
competitiveness. Whilst some cities will struggle to 
adapt, others might gain from economic opportunities 
opening up around low-carbon ‘cleantech’ industries. 
We have argued elsewhere that the new era of urban 
carbon control13  will have profound implications for 
the ways in which cities are governed and regulated. 
Cities will want to find ways of marrying on-going 
urban redevelopment and inward investment strategies 
with new approaches for developing renewable energy 
alternatives, investing in low-carbon infrastructure and 
transportation, and reducing energy costs for urban 
citizens. Hence the drive to develop a low-carbon 
urban political economy is likely to involve new urban 
alliances and networks as various interest groups and 
actors seek to mobilise around specific projects and 
investments consistent with carbon reduction goals 
and outcomes.  Our particular interest here lies in 
the differential capacities and capabilities of cities to 
13 While, A., Jonas, A.E.G., and Gibbs, D.C., (2010) ‘From sustainable development to carbon control: eco-state restructuring and the politics of regional development’ 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35 pp76-93; Jonas, A.E.G., Gibbs, D.C., and While, A., (2011) ‘The New Urban Politics as a politics of carbon control’ 
Urban Studies, 48 pp2537-2544.
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There can be little doubt that in Europe and North 
America low-carbon restructuring poses significant 
investment, organisational and legitimacy challenges 
for localities in the context of state fiscal austerity, 
utility privatisation and intense place competition for 
private investment and diminished state resources. 
Addressing these deficits may come to depend on the 
extent to which durable new urban climate alliances 
can be formed between various business interests and 
community actors capable of influencing local carbon 
economies. Examples may include:
•	 The	reorientation	of	urban	economic	
development coalitions around the goals of low-
carbon restructuring.
•	 New	alignments	between	interests	and	actors	
within cities around low-carbon projects and 
initiatives.
•	 Supply-side	local	energy	alliances	that	help	
support decentralised low-carbon energy 
initiatives and upgrade infrastructure.
•	 Enrolling	citizens	and	firms	into	carbon	reduction	
initiatives.
•	 Greater	collaboration	between	cities	through	
national and international urban networks.
•	 New	city-regional	collaborations	around	mass	
transportation, alternative fuel vehicles, and low 
carbon infrastructure.  
Attempts to exploit urban carbon economies mean 
that the city and its potential assets are being seen 
differently, creating space for alternative economic 
imaginaries and new forms of economic and societal 
organisation. However, as low-carbon economies 
come to ground at the urban scale there are pressing 
questions about the differential capability of cities to 
engage in low-carbon transitions and the potential 
implications for economic development or social 
protection. At issue is the search for new institutional 
vehicles for promoting low-carbon solutions and, 
with these, building necessary alliances between 
government, business and community sectors within 
and between cities. Clearly, some cities are in a stronger 
position than others to take the lead on these issues.
Hodson and Marvin14 describe the emergence of a 
new era of ‘Urban Ecological Security’ (UES), and 
demonstrate how already powerful places like London, 
Shanghai and New York are using their wealth to create 
enclaves of infrastructural security within which they 
can ward off the worst effects of climatic threats and 
energy insecurities. Accordingly Hodson and Marvin 
warn of the implications for cities and regions unable 
to securitise around energy and climate imperatives in 
terms of intensified socio-economic inequalities.   
Future research 
The low carbon transition demands new ways of 
approaching urban competitiveness in a post-neo-
liberal era. This presents significant challenges for 
urban governments given the prevailing context of state 
fiscal austerity, diminished local regulatory capacities 
and reduced government authority. Addressing these 
shortfalls and deficits may come to depend on the 
extent to which new climate alliances coalesce around 
the challenges and opportunities of low-carbon urban 
transitions.  Our on-going research is concerned with 
the impact of the ‘carbon calculus’ on the politics of 
urban development. Key questions with respect to new 
climate alliances include:
•	 What	does	climate	policy	mean	for	priorities	and	
alliances in local governance?
•	 What	new	climate	alliances	are	being	formed	in	
response to the urbanisation of climate change?  
•	 How	are	those	alliances	helping	to	support	
different aspects of low-carbon restructuring in 
terms of economic, social and ecological place 
resilience and adaptive capacity?
•	 Are	climate	alliances	challenging	or	reinforcing	
socio-economic and socio-spatial inequalities 
within and across cities?
•	 What	needs	to	be	done	to	help	support	the	
progressive potential of urban climate alliances?
Further reading
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14 Hodson, M., and Marvin, S., (2010) World Cities and Climate Change, Open University Press, Buckingham
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The notion of the Green Economy also bridges the gap 
between traditional urban tensions over sustainability 
versus economic growth (see Jonas, Gibbs and While in 
this volume). 
A 2011 report estimated that there were 51,900 green 
jobs in Yorkshire cities in 2009, which represented 
3.1% of total employment. Of the 51,900 green jobs 
21,700 were in the primary green economy, which 
has the potential to grow to 45,500 new green jobs by 
2020 adding 23,800 green jobs and further similar 
increases in associated supply chain and services 
sectors16.In 2012, the report Mini-Stern Review for 
Leeds: The Economics of Low Carbon Development 
investigated the economics of investing in the low 
carbon economy and found a strong economic case for 
low carbon development. It identified commercially 
viable, cost neutral and technically feasible investments 
which would reduce energy spend in the city and 
deliver decarbonisation. Similar economic cases have 
been identified for the Humber region, Sheffield and 
Birmingham under the same programme17.
This discussion describes on-going research which 
frames the issue of exploiting the green economy in 
Yorkshire cities, incorporating the cities of Hull, Leeds 
and Sheffield. The research investigates the direction 
of travel inferred by current strategies and policies 
that are being set by planners, economic strategists, 
politicians and business lobbies at the city level. By 
investigating the ways in which Leeds, Sheffield and 
Hull are positioning themselves to take advantage of the 
green economy and learning lessons from elsewhere in 
Europe and the US, we can ensure Yorkshire cities are 
adopting the right mix of policy, strategy and finance to 
deliver the benefits outlined in the above studies. This 
discussion focuses on the research on Hull where early 
results are shedding light on links between the way cities 
are run and the potential to bring the benefits of the 
‘Green Economy’ to ground in those cities. 
The ‘Green Economy’ is a loose term 
describing the jobs, services, investments, 
manufacturing and infrastructure 
associated with:
•	 Decarbonising the energy system – examples 
include the generation of renewable energy, new 
energy infrastructure or low carbon buildings.
•	 Improving resource efficiency – examples 
include recycling and reuse of waste or water,  
or sustainable products and materials.
•	 Preserving and enhancing the natural 
environment – examples include eco-systems 
and biodiversity, green infrastructure or 
sustainable agriculture.
Securing the Green 
Economy, city strategies 
for exploiting green 
growth
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Case study: Hull
The Green Economy in Hull is characterised 
by strengths in chemical manufacture and 
processing, low carbon buildings retrofit, waste 
and recycling, fuel biomass manufacture and 
energy generation. The currently underutilised 
port estate to the east of the city has potential to 
service the off-shore wind industry by providing 
a location for the manufacture of wind turbines 
and to service the associated supply chains. There 
is also significant potential for the growth of the 
existing biomass industry, including novel waste 
and recycling processing in the same area. In-
depth interviews conducted with business and 
civic leaders have highlighted a number of barriers 
to growing the green economy in the city:
•	 A	shortage	of	skills	to	service	the	engineering	
element of the offshore wind and energy 
generation aspects of the green economy.
•	 The	capacity	of	the	transport	network	 
serving the port estate to the east of the city.
•	 Smaller	firms	are	finding	it	difficult	to	 
secure long term contracts and break into 
established supply chains.
•	 The	capacity	of	small	firms	to	reach	
international standards of environmental 
management systems and quality  
management systems.
•	 Inconsistency	in	national	renewable	 
energy policy.
Figure 3: Biomass energy manufacture on the Humber (Image courtesy of Vivergo Fuels 2012).
New Climate Alliances30
Developments in economic governance since the 
election of the Coalition Government in 2010 have 
significantly changed the economic strategy landscape. 
Where before the region’s economic planning was 
coordinated by Yorkshire Forward (a pan-county 
development authority with significant funding), new 
arrangements across England in the form of smaller, 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) rely on heavy 
representation of local business to deliver economic 
growth. The LEP also has a coordinating role to play in 
securing the green economy:
The Humber LEP has been designated a ‘pathfinder’ 
for the Heseltine Report on pursuing growth in cities. 
This includes the combining of disparate funding 
streams to create a central pot approach to economic 
development in the Humber. These developments 
firmly place economic development on a Humber 
scale, channelling increasing levels of funding to try to 
combat the skills, infrastructure and business capacity 
needs at a local scale.
The ‘green economy’ is being earnestly pursued in 
Hull and the wider Humber region. Infrastructure 
spending, political capital, business lending and city 
strategies are beginning to coalesce around exploiting 
the opportunities presented by the green economy.
Responses to the interviews illustrate these challenges. 
Several respondents emphasised transport:
“One thing that worries me about the 
developments down by the ports is the 
transport and the infrastructure. One of the 
roads is horrendous. Their big investments 
might be too late.” 
(Local voluntary sector professional 2012)
“It’s common knowledge. Isn’t it? To get to the 
Greenport Hull, you have to fight your way 
through the A63 and plough your way through, 
which is a bottle neck.”
(Local business professional 2012)
Others referred to the issue of Standards:
“We’re going for ISO 9001 quality assurance, 
and we’re going for the environmental and the 
health and safety standards, because that’s an 
expectation of the major multi-nationals that 
are coming in.”
(Local business professional 2012)
On national policy one respondent stated:
“If the Government turns round to say:  
‘We are going to reduce the subsidy for 
renewable energy after a certain period’, 
then I think there will be second thoughts as 
to whether they will build factories. I think 
Government policy is the issue.”
(Local business professional 2012)
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The city strategies for green growth 
Findings from the research on the Hull case show 
significant barriers to overcome to secure the green 
economy in the city. These barriers, however, can and 
are being surmounted by new and innovative financing, 
funding and governance solutions. By negotiating new 
alliances around economic governance the Humber 
Local Enterprise Partnership was successful in being 
allocated one of the largest enterprise zones in the 
country to encourage the utilisation of the port estate 
to the east of the city for green economy development. 
Successive awards from the regional growth fund are 
specifically targeting the needs identified above and 
the municipal authorities of the Humber continue to 
focus on land use and economic development along the 
Humber Ports corridor. 
Other cities in the UK are already learning from cities 
such as Manchester in raising large sums to unblock 
transport infrastructure issues. There is a strong sense 
that this kind of policy cannot simply be transplanted 
onto Yorkshire cities. Leeds is working on its own 
version of a transport fund that could realise  
£1billion infrastructure investments over ten years, 
much of which will come from borrowing from 
financial markets and be recouped through property 
tax. The financial and legal implications for Hull and  
the Humber of such a move could lead to increased 
financial opportunities to secure new infrastructure 
that will ease infrastructure issues affecting the 
development of the green economy in  
the east of the city. 
For economically larger city regions such as Leeds, new 
ways of financing energy and transport infrastructure 
are being trialled along with new structures of 
governance designed to reflect the functional economic 
area of the city region. New finance structures for 
infrastructure and new governance vehicles pose 
multiple challenges when raising new borrowing which 
will ultimately be repaid locally through property, 
land or business taxes or by the realisation of revenues 
from what are essentially speculative green growth 
opportunities. The challenge in these cases is to build 
strong local political and business support for these new 
approaches to financing green growth. In the new era 
of localism and the increasing fiscal responsibilities of 
local government, it is crucial that the local economic 
development community strikes the right balance 
between unlocking real barriers to green growth, and 
becoming overleveraged in its pursuit of the same. 
Changes to the governance and finance landscape of 
English city regions provide opportunities to adopt 
new ways of addressing new problems. International 
research intelligence then, can contribute to effective 
realisation of the green economy. Evidence from North 
America, where infrastructure spending and municipal 
autonomy is more mature, can provide critical 
intelligence on the opportunities and pitfalls of new 
climate alliances pursuing the green economy. 
Insights from research on new economic geographies, 
urban theory, political science and public/private 
finance all have roles to play in investigating the 
strategies and challenges posed by governing climate 
change challenges through the new networks and 
structures emerging in the case study regions, England 
under localism, the politically devolved United 
Kingdom and beyond. 
Further reading
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The Humber is one of the North Sea’s principal 
estuaries. Largely fed by the Trent and Yorkshire Ouse 
river systems, its catchment covers an area of 24,472 
km2, which represents about one fifth of the land area 
of England. The catchment’s population is 11 million 
with about 400,000 people living on land ‘claimed’ 
from the estuary over the centuries. This floodplain 
(Figure 4) is protected by defences and, in addition 
to the settlements, has large tracts of high-grade 
agricultural land and industrial assets that include 
chemicals, oil refineries, food processing, aerospace, 
and power stations. It has the country’s largest port 
complex in terms of cargo handled - over 93 million 
tonnes in 2008.  
The area is attracting renewable energy industries 
including biomass power stations, biofuel plants and 
the manufacture and assembly of wind turbines for the 
North Sea. In addition there are studies on tidal power 
generation and carbon capture from power stations, 
and possibly other intensive emitters of carbon dioxide 
for storage in depleted North Sea gas fields.
The whole estuary is renowned for its water and 
intertidal habitats particularly the bird populations 
and the grey seal colony at the Humber’s mouth. Its 
ecological importance is recognised by being a Natura 
2000 site (Special Protection Area for Birds, Special 
Area of Conservation) and a Ramsar Site. These 
international designations form the Humber Estuary 
European Marine Site and ensure strict legal protection 
for the wildlife. The whole Humber catchment is a 
district for the EU Water Framework Directive and 
the first Humber River Basin Management Plan was 
published in 200919.
Climate change mitigation and 
adaptation is an important consideration 
for environmental planning and the 
implementation of projects for the 
Humber Estuary. There are potential 
conflicts between low-carbon industrial 
developments (and associated port 
expansion) and other environmental 
objectives concerned with reducing 
flood risks and protecting and enhancing 
habitats, including with obligations of 
EU Directives. There is a long history in 
the Humber catchment of partnership 
working involving a wide range of 
organisations to address these issues; the 
arrangements continue to evolve.
Humber Estuary  
climate change  
mitigation and  
adaption challenges
Tony Edwards, Humber Environmental  
Managers’ Network, UK18.
Figure 4. The Humber Estuary  
(Source: Environment Agency)
18 Email: tonym.edwards@btinternet.com.
19 Defra and Environment Agency (2009) Water for life and livelihoods: River Basin Management Plan Humber River Basin District – main report,  Environment Agency Bristol.
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Reconciling competing environmental objectives
There are potential conflicts between the actions 
required to achieve environmental objectives, 
particularly the siting of renewable energy facilities 
and associated port developments near to the Humber 
European Marine Site and in the tidal floodplain. 
Measures to reconcile potential conflicts include:
•	 Protection	of	existing	designated	areas	for	wildlife.
•	 Careful	location	of	new	major	estuary-related	
industrial developments, including environmental 
industries such as production of renewable energy 
technologies.
•	 Enhancement	of	wildlife	on	other	land	including	
some ‘spare’ industrial land.
•	 Creation	of	new	habitat	to	compensate	for	losses	
when an ‘imperative reason for over-riding public 
interest’ (IROPI) has been determined.
Managed realignment of flood defences to create 
habitat is one of the measures in the Environment 
Agency’s Humber Estuary Flood Risk Management 
Strategy; it has also been used to compensate for port 
expansion at Immingham and Hull. The wetlands 
created compensate for the loss of inter-tidal habitat 
by ‘coastal squeeze’. Climate change results in the rise 
of sea level; with the estuary confined by floodbanks 
the protected mudflats and reedbeds would otherwise 
be degraded. There is considerable controversy over 
such projects due to the loss of farmland and perceived 
impacts on local communities. Working in partnership 
has aided the understanding of the issues and each 
organisation’s needs leading to more acceptable, and 
sometimes novel, solutions. 
One example is the Alkborough project20. Land was 
purchased and the flood defences were breached 
in 2006 to return the tide to 440ha of arable land 
reclaimed from the estuary at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The scheme provides a variety 
of habitats, mostly intertidal wetland, plus areas 
of ‘sustainable farming’ also having benefits for 
wildlife. It is intended to compensate for habitat loss 
elsewhere in the Humber system due to sea level rise 
and engineering works. It also contributes to the UK’s 
Biodiversity Action Plan targets and provides flood 
storage for surge tides. There are opportunities for bird 
watching, ‘quiet’ countryside recreation and projects 
for conservation volunteers. Such wetlands absorb 
carbon dioxide and, thus contribute to climate change 
mitigation as well as adaptation. The project was 
undertaken by a coalition of Associated British Ports 
(ABP), Environment Agency, Natural England and 
North Lincolnshire Council with much engagement 
with the local residents.
Working in partnership
Several other examples of partnership working between 
Humber stakeholders – local councils, environmental 
regulators, industry, agriculture, local communities and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – are worth 
highlighting. The Humber Management Scheme which 
is required by the Conservation of Habitats and Species 
Regulations 2010 (previously the Habitats Regulations 
1994) to ensure that all forms of management of 
the estuary maintain the integrity and ‘favourable 
status’ of the nature conservation designations was 
adopted in 2005 and subsequently updated21. It is 
the responsibility of 34 statutory organisations with 
responsibilities for navigation, dredging, drainage, flood 
protection, effluent discharges, abstractions, fisheries, 
land use and land use planning. Climate change is a 
‘cross cutting’ issue. The Humber Estuary Relevant 
Authorities Group (HERAG) of organisations with 
statutory powers is responsible for the Scheme and is 
supported by the Humber Advisory Group (HAG) 
representing other stakeholders. HAG was involved 
in preparing the Codes of Conduct for recreation 
and other less regulated activities that supplement the 
Scheme.
Humber Industry Nature Conservation Association 
(INCA) is an alliance of industry, the public sector 
and civil society organisations. Its mission is ‘industry 
and nature in harmony’ and it aims to work with 
its members in helping meet their environmental 
obligations in an efficient manner. It has project 
managed intensive ecological surveys of the South 
Humber Gateway area zoned for estuary-related 
industry (including renewable energy) to provide data 
for environmental impact assessments and the strategic 
planning of compensation sites for habitat losses.
Networking between these groups helps integration 
and cooperation to achieve objectives for the Estuary 
and benefits for the community. The UK Government’s 
White Paper, The Natural Choice, introduced Local 
Nature Partnerships22. Their aim is to gain economic 
and social value from ecological services.  The Humber 
Local Nature Partnership is being established based 
on the work of the Management Scheme, Humber 
Advisory Group and Humber INCA.
20 Ashby-Crane, R., Keiller, D., Pygott, J., Richardson, H., Slaney, K., & Winn, P. (2004) ‘The Humber Estuary Paull Holme Strays opened, Alkborough on the way’, 
Proceedings of 39th Defra River and Coastal Management Conference, York.
21 Humber Estuary Relevant Authorities Group (2005) Humber Management Scheme, HERAG.
22  HM Government (2011) The natural choice: securing the value of nature, CM 8082 The Stationery Office Norwich.
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Research input – TIDE
Successful management needs to be founded on an 
appropriate evidence base supported by research. The 
TIDE Tidal River Development project of the EU 
INTERREG IVB North Sea Region Programme23  
concerns the practical management of large North 
Sea estuaries with ports, cities, industry, flood risks 
and wildlife, and the potential effects of climate 
change. The aim is to make ‘integrated management 
and planning a reality in the Elbe, Weser, Scheldt and 
Humber estuaries. Management must have the sole 
aim of maintaining ecosystem services while delivering 
societal benefits’. 
There is a need to understand the physical, biological 
and socio-economic nature of the estuaries and to 
have an integrated approach to delivering effective 
management. Lessons are being learnt from the 
practices utilised in each estuary such as the adverse 
impacts on water quality, the creation of tidal wetlands 
to compensate for habitat losses and working with local 
communities.  There will be a web-based ‘toolkit’ for 
practical management.
Conclusions 
Climate change in the Humber area poses 
both opportunities and threats for businesses, 
communities and the environment. There is scope 
for business and employment growth through the 
development of renewable energy. There are threats 
of increased flood risk and habitat loss. Rising sea 
level will degrade inter-tidal habitats unless new 
wetlands are created to compensate. 
An integrated approach to managing the ecosystem 
services of the Humber Estuary is required working 
with natural processes wherever possible. Alliances 
engaging industry, public agencies, NGOs and 
communities chart the way forward and help 
to deliver projects. There is a challenge to gain 
economic growth, new ports and industry whilst 
protecting the habitats and other environmental 
objectives.
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The Centre for European Union Studies (CEUS) 
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Europe, and is based in the School of Politics, 
Philosophy and International Studies at the 
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states, EU external relations, new modes of EU 
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